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THE IMMIGRANT RIGHT TO WORK
GEOFFREY HEEREN*
Federal and state policies that make immigrant work putatively illegal are in
tension with a constitutional right to work that is deeply rooted in United
States history and jurisprudence. The Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") regulates immigrant work through a system of employment authori-
zation and sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized immigrant work-
ers. This system has become such a central feature of immigration law that
few recognize it is a relatively recent innovation. While the United States has
always regulated its domestic labor market by modulating immigration,
regulation of work as a mechanism of immigration enforcement has only
existed since the 1980s. In order for that system to come into being, a radical
shift needed to occur: immigrants'right to work had to be forgotten.
From the late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries, courts
accepted that immigrants had a right to work based on substantive due
process and natural law. This article contends that there are strong constitu-
tional reasons to return to that principle, which has lapsed but has never
been overruled. The right of immigrants to work is "objectively, deeply
rooted this Nation's history and tradition," which is sufficient to trigger a
rigorous form of substantive due process review. No statute has ever been
passed that revokes immigrants' right to work; the laws that exist today do
not ban unauthorized immigrants from working but instead utilize employer
sanctions to relegate them to various forms of contingent work. In these
positions, immigrant workers are denied the bundle of rights and protections
that go along with the traditional employment relationship. They face
exploitation, lower wages, unsafe conditions, and retaliatory discharge or
reporting to DHS.
This system of subordination arose during the late 1970s after a dramatic
curtailment in legal Western Hemisphere immigration virtually assured a
constant campaign of deportation against millions of predominately Latin
American unauthorized immigrants. Policymakers discouraged unauthor-
ized immigrant employment as a strategy to reduce the wave of illegal
* Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. I would like to thank Rosalie Berger
Levinson, David Herzig, Marty Lederman, Jennifer J. Lee, Stephen Legomsky, Peter Markowitz,
Jason Parkin, Barry Sullivan, Mary Szto, D.A. Jeremy Telman, Bernard Trujillo, and the participants
at work-in-progress sessions at the Emerging Immigration Scholars' Conference, the AALS Clinical
Conference, the Seventh Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium at Loyola University, Chicago, and
faculty workshops at Arkansas, South Carolina, and Valparaiso. © 2017, Geoffrey Heeren.
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
immigration they had created-a goal that has so far not been met. This
history shows that the ineffective policies of the present day raise significant
constitutional concerns, and it is time to reconsider them. One way to do so is
by taking a second look at the right to work that was well established uring
an earlier era of United States history.
I. INTRODUCTION
For much of United States history, immigrants had a right to work.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century courts viewed work as a natural right,
and a central aspect of the liberty and property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause.2 When states tried to keep out or drive out
immigrants by restricting their job opportunities through licensing, permit-
ting, or zoning laws, federal courts routinely struck down these efforts.3 It
was not until the late 1970s that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") began to limit immigrants' right to work by developing a comprehen-
sive system for authorizing immigrant employment.4 Congress followed up
with the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") of 1986, which for
the first time imposed sanctions on employers who hired unauthorized
immigrant workers.5 This was a paradigm shift: while immigration was once
a means for regulating the supply of labor in the country, employment
regulation since the 1980s has become a mechanism of immigration
enforcement.6
However, neither IRCA nor any other federal statute has ever prohibited
unauthorized immigrants from working, as long as they do not use false
documents to do so.7 When an unauthorized immigrant worker works for an
employer, it is the employer who violates the law by hiring an unauthorized
immigrant, not the worker.
Unauthorized immigrant workers continue to work despite employer
sanctions, not only because it is lawful, but also because they have to in order
to feed themselves and their families.8 Work is one of the most basic human
1. See infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 115, 274A, 100 Stat.
3359, 3360, 3384 (making employment of unauthorized immigrants unlawful and increasing
enforcement of existing immigration laws).
6. See Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 137 (2002) (noting that IRCA
"effectively makes employers parties to enforcement of the immigration laws affecting the labor
market.").
7. Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and
Employment Law, 31 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 125, 140 (2009) [hereinafter Griffith, Migrant Worker
Law] ("IRCA [the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986] did not explicitly make it illegal for
an undocumented employee to simply seek or accept employment in the United States.").
8. See Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Share of Unauthorized Immigrant Workers in Production,
Construction Jobs Falls Since 2007, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 5 (2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2
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activities and the source of not only physical sustenance, but also societal
respect and emotional fulfillment. 9 Courts once agreed that immigrants had a
constitutional right to work, based on natural law principles set out in
fundamental constitutive documents of the United States, like the Declara-
tion of Independence."' In sharp contrast, unauthorized immigrant work
today is putatively illegal-discouraged (but not actually banned) through a
work permit system and employer sanctions. 1
The putative illegality of unauthorized work puts unauthorized workers in
a uniquely poor bargaining position in the economy. Employers who know of
their workers' unauthorized status can use that knowledge as leverage to
blackmail them into accepting conditions that do not comply with federal and
state employment laws.12 Many large and well-established employers, of
course, do not wish the exposure that comes with openly hiring unauthorized
workers. Yet they can still secure the economic benefit of hiring unauthorized
immigrant workers by participating in the "fissured workplace": a growing
network of non-traditional work relationships, such as independent contract-
ing, subcontracting, and franchising. 13 According to one estimate, about 13%
of the labor force is composed of independent contractors: workers who
theoretically control the terms and conditions of their work.14 If self-
employed workers, agency temps, on-call workers, and contract company
workers are added in, the number rises to nearly a quarter of the United States
workforce. 
15
Companies or individuals do not for the most part face sanctions under
IRCA if they hire unauthorized immigrant workers who are independent
contractors.16 The independent contractor exception opens a vast swath of
015/03/26/share-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers-in-production-construction-j bs-falls- since-20
07/ (the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States labor force has ranged from 8.1
million to 8.3 million since 2007).
9. See STUDS TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY Do ALL DAY AND How THEY
FEEL ABOUT WHAT THEY Do xiii (1974).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2011)
("growing evidence suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized
counterparts to experience labor violations."); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (2007). For a discussion
of the workplace rights that arguably do apply to unauthorized migrants, see Keith Cunningham-
Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1361, 1367-71 (2009);
D. Carolina Ninez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and
Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 817, 849-60 (2010).
13. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 11-13 (2014).
14. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS,
EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS, LETTER TO THE HONORABLE PATTY MURRAY, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE
ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 16 (APRIL 20, 2015).
15. Id. at 15-16.
16. Independent contractors are excluded from the definition of "employee" under IRCA and
persons or entities therefore have no obligation to check the citizenship status or employment
authorization of independent contractors. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(f). However, a person or entity who
knowingly contracts with an unauthorized worker knowing that he or she is unauthorized can be
2017]
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occupations for unauthorized immigrant workers; landscapers, general con-
tractors, barbers, and home health care workers are all examples of occupa-
tions commonly structured as independent contractors. With the spread of the
fissured workplace, large employers can subcontract out corporate functions
to entities that might be more willing to directly hire unauthorized workers,
or to hire independent contractors who are unauthorized to work.
In addition to the independent contractor exception, there are two other
significant gaps in IRCA. The employment of one's self does not violate
IRCA, and many unauthorized workers are self-employed entrepreneurs.
17
Last, persons can hire irregular domestic workers, such as housecleaners or
part-time nannies, without violating IRCA. 18
What all these positions have in common is that they do not come with the
bundle of rights that typically accompanies a formal employment relation-
ship: minimum wage and overtime, Social Security and other retirement
benefits, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, collective bargain-
ing rights, and the protection of federal antidiscrimination laws.1 9 Thus, the
primary impact of employer sanctions is not to ban unauthorized workers
from working, but to relegate them to contingent positions where they do not
receive the rights and protections that traditional employees take for granted.
Therefore, unauthorized immigrant workers are literally subordinate in the
workplace; IRCA does not bar them from working, just from accessing the
rights that other workers have. They typically receive less pay than autho-
rized workers do in exchange for largely manual labor jobs that come with a
risk of poisoning by pesticides and industrial chemicals, debilitating work-
place accidents, retaliatory discharge, and other labor law violations.20 All
subject to liability under IRCA even if the worker is an independent contractor. 8 U.S. Code
§ 1324a(a)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.5. Thus, an individual or entity might face sanctions if the individual
or entity has independent knowledge that an independent contractor is not authorized to work.
17. See Cindy Carcamo, Immigrants Lacking Papers Work Legally As Their Own Bosses, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2013; Michael Mastman, Undocumented Entrepreneurs: Are Business Owners
"Employees" Under the Immigration Laws?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 225, 252 (2008)
(analyzing IRCA's employer sanctions provisions and determining that they do not prevent unauthor-
ized immigrants from owning businesses). One study using data from the 1990 Census and the
Legalized Population Survey (LPS) found that the rate of self-employment among undocumented
male (female) immigrants was 4.6 percent (3.6 percent) in 1989 and 8.3 percent (5.1 percent) in 1992
after legalization through the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Robert W. Fairlie & Christopher
Woodruff, Mexican Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of Self-Employment in Mexico and the United
States, in GEORGE J. BORJAS, MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 154 (2007). If this rate of
self-employment among undocumented immigrants has remained constant, about 450,000 of the
estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants would be self-employed.
18. 8 C.F.R. § 274a. 1 (h) (excluding "domestic service in a private home that is sporadic, irregular,
or intermittent" from the definition of employment under IRCA).
19. WEIL, supra note 13, at 17-18. For a discussion concerning whether undocumented immigrants
who are not working as independent contractors receive these protections, see Cunningham-
Parmenter and Nuiez, supra note 12.
20. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT, ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA'S CITIES (2008) (finding high incidence of labor law
violations for unauthorized immigrant workers), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Broken
LawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn= 1; FARMWORKER JUSTICE, EXPOSED AND IGNORED: How PESTICIDES ARE
ENDANGERING OUR NATION'S FARMWORKERS (2013) (documenting the health impact of pesticide
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the while, deportation hangs over their heads as a cudgel for unscrupulous
employers to use against them-a stick that would not exist if employers
were not required by law to inquire into immigration status.
2 1
Certain aspects of this situation could be remedied if courts recognized
what once was a truism: immigrants have a right to work. Given the historical
protection of the immigrant right to work, it seems to satisfy the Washington
v. Glucksberg standard for assessing whether a right is fundamental enough
to deserve protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as a matter of
substantive due process: whether it is "objectively, deeply rooted in United
States history.,
22
Admittedly, recognizing an immigrant right to work would be in tension
with courts' longstanding reluctance to apply heightened review to economic
legislation since the rejection of this approach in Lochner v. New York.23
Expansion of judicial protection for economic rights could be a Pandora's
box, possibly resulting in the invalidation of modern labor law. However,
there are principled ways to expand select economic rights without holding
all progressive economic legislation unconstitutional.24 One possible limit-
ing principle comes from the Court's recent decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges.25 In that case, the Court found the history of subordination against
LGBT persons supported the invocation of a substantive due process right to
marry, even though LGBT persons had not historically enjoyed protection of
that right.26 Much like same-sex couples, immigrants have also experienced
subordination; the workplace subordination of unauthorized immigrant work-
ers is part and parcel of a larger history of discrimination, violence, and
exploitation of immigrants in the United States. Thus, it is possible to legally
distinguish between the workplace rights of subordinated immigrants and
those of, for example, an employee who does not wish to pay union fees.
Accordingly, there is a sound basis for treating them differently.
27
exposure to farmworkers), http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/aExposed%20and
%20Ignored%20by%2OFarmworker%2OJustice%20singles%20compressed.pdf; Passel & Cohn, su-
pra note 11, at 8-9 (unauthorized immigrants hold jobs in agriculture, service, and construction at a
disproportionately high rate); Jayesh M. Rathod, Beyond the "Chilling Effect": Immigrant Worker
Behavior and the Regulation of Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMp. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 267,
275 76 (2010) (noting a rise in workplace accidents among the foreign-born population in the United
States).
21. See Wishnie, supra note 12, at 215.
22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
23. For a discussion of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its demise, see Richard E.
Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward A Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73
N.C. L. Rev. 329, 344 (1995).
24. As an example of one such argument, see id. at 413-42.
25. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
26. See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16 (2015);
Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015).
27. For a discussion of the role that the anti-subordination principle has played in legal analysis,
see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003, 1048 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-33
(1994).
2017]
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There are four parts to this argument. Part One provides a historical
overview of immigrants' jurisprudential right to work and the relative
absence of federal regulation of immigrant labor during the same time
period. This history shows that immigrants' right to work is deeply rooted in
United States history. Part Two describes how federal regulation of immi-
grant labor began to take place as courts simultaneously shifted away from
recognizing immigrants' constitutional right to work. This shift accelerated
in the 1970s as policymakers dramatically curtailed legal Western Hemi-
sphere immigration and became concerned about the increase in illegal
immigration that occurred as a result.28 Believing that jobs were a magnet for
illegal immigration, Congress restricted immigrant employment and made
work authorization central to the overall immigration enforcement strategy.
29
Part Three contends that laws that evolved out of this era concerning
noncitizens' work made unauthorized work only putatively illegal and
subordinated unauthorized immigrant workers without significantly reducing
illegal immigration. Finally, Part Four argues that immigrants' right to work
ought to be revived because it is deeply rooted in United States history and
because immigrant workers have experienced subordination.
This article argues that noncitizens have a right to work whether they have
a formal immigration status or not. That does not mean the right to work can
never be restricted. The exact contours of the right to work and the standard
for evaluating restrictions on it are beyond the scope of this article. Neverthe-
less, if a constitutional right to work does exist for immigrants, then two
significant conclusions follow. First, a President may expand immigrant
work authorization without specific congressional approval. Second, govern-
ment actions that significantly burden the immigrant right to work-like
provisions criminalizing unauthorized work or taking work authorization
away from classes of noncitizens who currently have it-should trigger
judicial review.
II. THE ORIGINS OF IMMIGRANTS' RIGHT TO WORK
Immigration has always been closely connected to labor in this country.
30
Throughout United States history, immigration controls have operated as a
means to meet labor needs during times of economic prosperity or to protect
jobs held by American citizens during times of economic malaise.31 It is only
in the last few decades that another system has arisen, under which labor
regulation has come to serve as a means of immigration enforcement.
28. See infra Part II.
29. Id.
30. E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1789 1965 492
(1981).
31. JUAN F. PEREA, ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA
(Thomson/West 3d ed. 2007).
[Vol. 31:243
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Previously, the federal government did not regulate immigrant work. When
states did, courts struck down their efforts as a violation of immigrant rights.
A. The Absence of Federal Regulation of Immigrant Work Prior to the
1940s
In the nineteenth century, the Industrial Revolution created a seemingly
endless need for labor. The United States met this need in part through
policies encouraging immigration. Early federal immigration laws, such as
the Contract Labor Law of 1864, were intended to increase, rather than
reduce, immigration.32 The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 encouraged Chinese
immigration in particular-a key source of labor to build the infrastructure
necessary for an expanding nation.3 3 However, states like California reacted
with hostility to the entry of large numbers of Chinese immigrants.34
Organized labor objected to the use of contract immigrant laborers to break
35strikes and depress wages.
As a result, Congress passed a series of laws that, for the first time,
restricted immigration. The Page Act of 1875 prohibited immigration of
Asian forced laborers and prostitutes.36 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
prohibited all Chinese immigration.37 The 1885 Contract Labor Law banned
American employers from entering into labor contracts with individuals prior
to their immigration to the United States, and forbade ship captains from
transporting immigrants under labor contracts.38 There were, however, a
variety of exceptions to the new Contract Labor Law, such as for "foreigners
temporarily residing in the United States, skilled workmen for any new
industry not established in the United States and artists, lecturers, and
servants.3 9 In 1903, Congress banned advertising intended to encourage
immigration of noncitizen laborers.40
This early round of immigration regulation may have been a response to
declining wages for unskilled labor.4 1 It aimed to fortify wages by restricting
the supply of new laborers. Immigration and labor were so strongly linked in
the views of policymakers that, shortly after the Department of Commerce
and Labor was formed in 1903, the Bureau of Immigration was transferred
32. An Act to Encourage Immigration, 13 Stat. 385 (1864).
33. See Tim Wu, Treaties'Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 616 (2007).
34. Id.
35. ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 246
(1998).
36. The Page Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 477, 477 78 (1875).
37. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58 59 (1882).
38. Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885).
39. H. Rep. No. 1365, at 1662 (1952).
40. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
41. Ashley S. Timmer & Jeffrey G. Williams, Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor
Markets, Policy Interactions, and Globalization Backlash, 24 POPULATION & DEV. REv., 739, 759
(1998).
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from the Treasury Department to the newly created department.2 When
Commerce and Labor broke off into separate departments, immigration
remained with the Department of Labor.43
Though immigration restrictions ostensibly protected the domestic labor
market, they often reflected the nation's racial biases. For example, the 1907
Immigration Act gave the president authority "to refuse immigration to
certain persons when he was satisfied that such immigration was detrimental
to labor conditions here."44 In response to continuing public opposition to
Asian immigration, President Theodore Roosevelt used this authority in 1907
to exclude Japanese and Korean laborers entering the United States from
Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii.45 Because immigration laws functioned as a
means for regulating the labor supply in the United States, immigrants who
were already in the United States faced no federal regulation of their right to
work.
In 1924, Congress passed the first truly comprehensive immigration law,
the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act.46 The law did not restrict the right of
immigrants to work; even students, under the Act's regulations, had a right to
work to support themselves.47 The Johnson-Reed Act regulated immigration
through a series of national origin quotas that were intentionally designed to
maintain a predominately white, Western European immigrant pool.48 Asian
immigration was barred entirely.4 9 However, the quotas did not apply to the
Western Hemisphere, largely because policymakers believed that Mexican
migrant workers were essential to meeting the country's labor needs and that
Mexican migrants would not remain or the flow of Mexican immigration
could easily be controlled.0
While quotas did not apply to the Western Hemisphere, immigration
authorities used their discretionary powers to prevent Mexican nationals
from obtaining immigrant visas to reside permanently in the United States.1
Many Mexicans therefore chose to enter as nonimmigrants, but eventually
lost lawful status after overstaying their visas.5 2 This unlawful status made it
easier to deport them when the labor market changed during the Great
Depression.3 In the early 1930s, for example, over 400,000 Mexican
nationals and United States citizens of Mexican descent were deported or
42. Act of February 14, 1903, ch. 552 (1903).
43. An Act to Create a Department of Labor, Pub. L. No. 426-62 (1913).
44. H. Rep. No. 1365 at 1669 (1952).
45. Id.
46. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1938).
48. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
21-37 (2003) [hereinafter NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS].
49. Id. at 37.
50. Id. at 50.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 70.
53. Id. at 129 35.
[Vol. 31:243
THE IMMIGRANT RIGHT TO WORK
repatriated under the aegis of Secretary of Labor William Doak, who
"believed that deportation enforcement was a good way to create jobs for
unemployed Americans during the Depression.5 4 During this period of
minimal due process protection for immigrants, immigration enforcement
was another way that government officials sought to regulate the domestic
labor market. Able to engage in massive deportation round-ups with appar-
ently minimal judicial oversight, there was little need for policymakers to try
to limit the right of immigrants in the United States to work.
B. Early Right to Work Jurisprudence
In the absence of federal statutory limitations on immigrant labor, states
sometimes tried to step in to regulate immigrant work. The federal courts and
some state courts generally struck down these efforts. In doing so, they relied
on a constitutional right to work that was often grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Initially, the Supreme Court rejected the position that the Due Process
Clause protected a right to work in the Slaughterhouse Cases. However,
Justices Field and Bradley strongly dissented from this position, and their
view soon prevailed.6 In a series of decisions throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court recognized that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause protected a right to work.5 7 The
Court often used the language of natural law to infer a right to work from the
Due Process Clause, which protected against state deprivations of "life,
liberty, or property.,5 8 For example, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Court stated
that the protection of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause mbraced:
... [T]he right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.9
54. Id. at 71 75; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 215
(2010).
55. See Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S.
746, 759 (1884) (rejecting various constitutional challenges to the grant of a monopoly to a
slaughterhouse company, including one based in substantive due process).
56. See id. at 762 (Bradley, J., concurring) ("the right to follow any of the common occupations of
life is an inalienable right").
57. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678,
684 (1888) ("enjoyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of the
privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, is
an essential part of his rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment").
58. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
59. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
2017]
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Allgeyer is now considered the beginning of the 1897-1937 "Lochner era,"
named after Lochner v. New York, which invalidated state legislation limiting
weekly work hours.60 The Court's tendency during that era to strike down
progressive legislation as violating a substantive due process right to contract
has come to be viewed as a form of dubious judicial activism.61 However, as
further discussed in Part IV, revisionist scholarship has considerably quali-
fied that critique.6 2
Although Allgeyer spoke of the right of "citizens" to labor, noncitizens
were among the earliest beneficiaries of the Court's right to work. Lochner
itself addressed a New York law that may have been drafted to disadvantage
immigrant bakers who were willing to work longer hours.63 In fact, courts
began to invalidate legislation limiting immigrants' right to work about
twenty years before the official start of the Lochner era.64 The Supreme
Court's seminal immigrant right to work case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, came ten
years before Allgeyer. This has led some commentators to label Yick Wo as
a Lochner precursor.66 However, Yick Wo did not exist in a vacuum; it was
part of a sizeable body of contemporary case law concerning immigrants'
right to work that both preceded and post-dated the official Lochner era.67
Nineteenth and early twentieth century cases relied on various textual
sources for these decisions, but they all took as a given that immigrants
generally had a "right to work.",68 Commentators from the time period also
60. Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism," 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 55,
56 (2010).
61. Id.
62. See infra Part IV.B.
63. David Bernstein, The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights," 1886 1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725,
734 36 (1990).
64. Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566 (1879).
65. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance
regulating laundries that had a disparate impact on Chinese-owned businesses.
66. Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1359, 1364, 1373 (2008); Thomas Wuil Joo, New "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 356 (1995).
67. See Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 35, 41 (1915); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357 59, 369 70 (1886); Fraser v. McConway & Torley
Co., 82 F. 257 (C.C.D. Pa. 1897); In re Yot Sang, 75 F. 983 (1896); In re Ah Chong, 2 Fed. 733 (1880);
Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566 (C.C.D. Or. 1879); In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); Ex
parte Case, 116 P. 1037-38 (Idaho 1911); State v. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Me. 1900); Templar v. Bd.
of Exam'rs, 90 N.W. 1058 (Mich 1902); George v. Portland, 235 P. 681 (Or. 1925); Carvallo v.
Cooper, 239 N.Y.S. 436 (1930).
68. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 422 (1948) (California statute barring
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship under federal law
violated equal protection); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (statute denying pawnbrokers'
licenses to aliens violated treaty with Japan); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35, 41 (1915) (using
natural rights language and locating the right of noncitizens to work in the Fourteenth Amendment);
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357 59, 369 70 (1886) (discussing natural rights in the context of striking
down a law regulating laundry businesses in San Francisco because unequal enforcement of the law
violated equal protection); Fraser, 82 F. At 259 (C.C.D. Pa.1897) (Pennsylvania tax of male
noncitizens over twenty-one of three cents per day for each day employed was evidently "intended to
hinder the employment of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over twenty-one years of age"
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agreed that immigrants had a right to work, arguing at times for an even more
robust version of the right than courts entertained.69 Courts found exceptions
for jobs involving public works,
70 public resources,7 1 or the "police power,
' 72
but, all in all, it is remarkable how far they went extending immigrants a right
to work. Even when that right was based on Constitutional equal protection
theories or international treaties, there was often an emphasis on substantive
due process and the language of natural law.73 Sometimes the right of
immigrants to work seemed linked in the analysis of courts to the right of
and was therefore prohibited by [Fourteenth Amendment]."); In re Tie Loy (The Stockton Laundry
Case), 26 F. 611, 613 15 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (city ordinance prohibiting the opening of laundries
violates the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as due process
and equal protection); ; In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (using natural law language to
hold that a San Francisco ordinance requiring consent of Board of Supervisors to operate a laundry
violated treaty with China); In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733 (C.C.D. Ca. 1880) (striking down a CA law that
denied fishing rights to all who were ineligible to become electors, meaning Chinese persons, as a
violation of Equal Protection and the Treaty with China); In re Tiburcio Parrot, 1 F. 481, 510 (C.C.D.
Ca. 1880) (Sawyer, J., concurring) ("to deprive a man of the right to select and follow any lawful
occupation that is, to labor, or contract to labor, if he so desires and can find employment is to
deprive him of both liberty and property, within the meaning of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and
the act of congress."); Baker v. Portland, 5 Sawy. 566 (C.C.D. Or. 1879) (Oregon statute barring
holders of contracts for public work within the state from employing Chinese persons violated Treaty
with China); Exparte Case, 116 P. 1037, 1038 (Idaho 1911) (Idaho statute prohibiting employment of
noncitizens violated equal protection and the right to contract); Chicago v. Hulbert, 68 N.E. 786 (Ill.
1903) (state law requiring bidders for state public work contracts to work personnel only eight hours
per day and use only citizen labor violated the right to contract); State v. Montgomery, 47 A. 165, 169
(Me. 1900) (state legislation barring aliens from obtaining hawker's or peddler's licenses denied
equal protection, broadly defined to embrace the right of all persons to pursue business and property
on an even footing); Templar v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 90 N.W. 1058 (Mich. 1902) (ordinance denying
barbers' licenses to noncitizens violated Fourteenth Amendment).; Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245, 246
(Cal. 1892) (ordinance requiring a permit to open a laundry violated "the inalienable right of such
person to engage in a lawful occupation," and "the right of the owner of property to devote it to a
lawful purpose").
69. NORMAN ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1931); WILLIAM
MARION GIBSON, ALIENS AND THE LAW: SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL TREATMENT OF ALIENS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1940); Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination Against the Alien
in His Right to Work, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 74 (1934 35).
70. Early cases sometimes found that states had authority to deny various sorts of occupational
licenses to noncitizens as an exercise of their "police power," based on the dubious theory that
noncitizens were less likely to uphold the public order in certain supposedly sensitive types of work.
See Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding Cincinnati ordinance denying licenses to
operate pool rooms to aliens); Anton v. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (D. Or. 1924) (same); Commonwealth
v. Hana, 81 N.E. 149 (Mass. 1907) (upholding ban of issuance of hawkers' licenses to noncitizens);
Trageser v. Gray, 20 A. 905 (Md. 1890) (upholding ban on issuing retail liquor licenses to
noncitizens).
71. Other cases upheld discrimination in employment in public works on the theory that when a
state acted as employer it was as free to discriminate against noncitizens a  a private employer at that
time would have been. See Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915); Lee v. City of Lynn, 111 N.E. 700 (Mass. 1916); People v. I.M. Ludington's Sons, Inc., 131
N.Y.S. 550 (Orleans Cty. Ct. 1911).
72. Another line of cases held that state resources were collective property, owned by state
citizens, meaning that the state could deny noncitizens licenses related to the use of public resources,
such as fishing licenses. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (oyster fishing); Tokai Maru,
190 F. 450 (9th Cir. 1911) (commercial fishing); People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232 (1850) (gold mines); Ex
parte Gilletti, 70 So. 446 (Fla. 1915) (commercial oyster fishing); State v. Kofines, 80 A. 432 (R.I.
1911) (fishing licenses).
73. See infra note 84.
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businesses to exploit them,7 4 but most of the decisions redounded to
immigrants' benefit during an era of government-supported xenophobia,
discrimination, and anti-immigrant violence.
Though the Lochner era ended around 1937, the Court has continued to
strike down state efforts to regulate labor by lawful immigrants (except for
jobs with a "governmental function," i.e. those related to self-government
and the democratic process).7 6 However, decisions in immigrant work cases
have moved away from the language of natural rights, due process, and the
right to contract, and have coalesced around a theory that state efforts to deny
employment to lawful immigrants implicate equal protection and fail to
satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny unless they fall within the "govern-
mental function" exception.7 7 This remains an undisputed point of law today,
although the current Court may be inclined to strike down state regulation of
immigrant employment on preemption grounds rather than equal protection.78
Two characteristics distinguished the earlier cases from the current equal
protection jurisprudence concerning alienage-based restrictions. First, the
current case law seems almost entirely limited to discrimination against
immigrants with lawful status, typically lawful permanent residency. The
earlier line of cases, however, recognized a right to work even for immigrants
who were the closest thing the nineteenth and early twentieth century had to
unpopular "illegal aliens": Chinese nationals. There was no such thing as a
"lawful permanent resident" until 1952,79 and most immigrants of the time
were recognized as being on a potential pathway to citizenship, except Asian
immigrants, who were ineligible for naturalization.8 0 In addition, Chinese
nationals were excluded from admission to the United States in 1882 (and in
1924, all Asian immigrants were excluded).8 1 Those who could prove they
had resided in the United States prior to a certain date and who could meet the
74. For example, in Glover v. People, 66 N.E. 820 (Ill. 1903), the court upheld a taxpayer suit
challenging a state law requiring bidders for state public work contracts to work personnel only eight
hours per day and use only citizen labor. In upholding the challenge, the court found, essentially, that
it was public policy to get the work done as cheaply as possible. Id. at 822.
75. Bernstein, Chinese Laundry Cases, infra note 244, at 217 69 (1999).
76. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (upholding a citizenship requirement for
probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73 75 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection
challenge to New York's refusal to employ elementary and secondary school teachers who are eligible
for citizenship but who refuse to seek naturalization); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
(upholding a New York requirement that police officers be citizens).
77. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-27 (1984); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973); Gebin v. Mineta, 231 F.Supp. 2d 971, 976 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Szeto v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 508 F.Supp. 268, 272 (E.D. La. 1981); Younus v.
Shabat, 336 F.Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1971) aff'd, (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 1973); Sundram v. City of
Niagara Falls, 357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 44 A.D.2d 906 (1974).
78. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (striking down Arizona's
effort to make unauthorized work a criminal offense as being preempted by federal immigration law).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1952).
80. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 115 25 (2006).
81. KANSTROOM, supra note 54, at 109 21; NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 48, at 37 50.
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onerous registration requirements of the Geary Act of 1892 could in theory
remain; all others were subject to summary deportation.82 Yet even as the
legislation of the period spelled out the deportability of most Chinese
nationals, it implicitly recognized their employability-referring explicitly to
them in the statutory text as "Chinese laborers.83
The second characteristic distinguishing the early right-to-work cases
from the more recent line of cases is an understanding of work as a
substantive due process or a natural right.8 4 Contemporary cases view
discrimination as the problem meriting judicial intervention, but earlier cases
saw the right to work as a universal aspect of liberty or autonomy. For
example, in In re Quong Woo, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, sitting
as a circuit judge, held that the right to pursue an occupation free from
unreasonable government regulation was a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.85 Even when striking down state legislation as a
violation of equal protection, courts used due process-like language to do so,
defining equal protection as embracing a right of all persons to pursue
business and property on equal terms.8 6 Although ostensibly based on equal
protection, Yick Wo v. Hopkins relied on substantive due process and natural
rights language to strike down San Francisco's licensing provisions for
laundries, which had a disparate impact on Chinese persons:
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
87
82. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728 (1893).
83. Geary Act, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25 (1892) ("any Chinese laborer, within the limits of the
United States, who shall neglect, fail, or refuse to comply with the provisions of this act, or who, after
one year from the passage hereof, shall be found within the jurisdiction of the United States without
such certificate of residence, shall be deemed and adjudged to be unlawfully within the United States,
and may be arrested, by any United States customs official, collector of internal revenue or his
deputies, United States marshal or his deputies, and taken before a United States judge, whose duty it
shall be to order that he be deported from the United States .... ).
84. See, e.g., Anton v. Van Winkle, 297 Fed. 340 (1924) ("Plaintiff, [a non-citizen] along with
citizens of the United States, has the right to work and so employ himself as to gain a livelihood.
Primarily, he has the same right and privilege as citizens under similar conditions to engage in useful
gainful employment and occupations, unless they pertain to the regulation or distribution of the
public domain, or to the common property or resources of the people of the State ... or pertain to
public works or benefits to be received from public moneys.").
85. See In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 233 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
86. See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 47 A. 165, 169 (Me. 1900) (a licensing requirement for a
noncitizen to engage in peddling "absolutely denies him the privilege of an occupation open to
citizens, which is more than a discrimination in burdens. It does not permit the alien within our
jurisdiction to pursue a business occupation and to acquire and enjoy property on equal terms with the
citizen.") According to Professor Gabriel Chin, late nineteenth century courts held that all due
process violations concerning work and property were automatically equal protection violations
"because others were allowed to pursue their occupations and retain their property." Chin, supra note
66, at 1364, 1375.
87. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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The right that emerged from these cases cannot be entirely dismissed as a
species of deference to business interests. Taken in its entirety, this jurispru-
dence offered the outlines of an individual right based in notions of autonomy
and individual liberty, which was especially protective of immigrants in part
because they were the subjects of societal discrimination.8 8
III. THE END OF IMMIGRANTS' RIGHT TO WORK
After the Court repudiated Lochner in West Coast Hotel in 1937,89 courts
eventually stopped using the sweeping language contained in earlier right-to-
work cases. Instead, courts assessed immigrant work cases using preemption
analysis or the growing body of modern equal protection law, which was
doctrinally skewed to defer to the federal government in cases of federal
discrimination against noncitizens.90 At the same time, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") began incrementally regulating immigrant
labor.91 However, the first comprehensive employment authorization regula-
tions was not proposed until the late 1970s, after Congress had extended the
country quotas to the Western Hemisphere, virtually assuring the presence of
a massive population of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the country.
92
In response to this self-created immigration crisis, policymakers chose the
Sisyphean task of restricting immigrant work rather than fixing the irratio-
nally low immigration quota for Mexico. In a relatively short timeframe,
immigrant work shifted from a national asset to presumptively illegal, and
work authorization became an element of the overall immigration enforce-
ment strategy. The imposition of employer sanctions with passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") of 1986 and the development
of E-Verify in the 1990s-2000s fortified this sea change.
93
A. The 1940s-1960s: Incremental Agency Regulation
The first significant federal restriction on noncitizens' legal right to work
came with the "Bracero" program.94 The program began in 1942 with the
negotiation of an agreement between the executive branch and Mexico to
import a large, temporary workforce of Mexican laborers into the United
88. See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S (2001) (early Lochner Court decisions laid foundation for constitu-
tional right to privacy).
89. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1987) (stating that the
downfall of Lochner is associated with the decision of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937)).
90. See supra notes 77-78.
91. See infra Part II.A.
92. Id.
93. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
94. For a general discussion of the Bracero Program, see KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE
BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992).
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States.95 The Bracero program was widely criticized for leading to violations
of the Braceros' workplace rights, and was both preceded and followed by
massive deportation campaigns that specifically targeted Mexican nationals.
96
In general, the Bracero program followed the preexisting pattern of
immigration regulation as a means of controlling the domestic labor supply.
Braceros were imported to meet labor needs, and the number of Braceros
could be increased or decreased depending on economic interests. However,
there was one significant difference between Braceros and earlier immigrants
who had entered to meet the country's labor needs. The five million
temporary workers who were imported into the United States over the
twenty-two years of the Bracero program were contractually bound to their
employers and therefore restricted from pursuing other employment.97 This
limitation on the mobility of immigrant workers represented one of the first
instances of federal regulation of immigrants' right to work.
In 1947, the INS also promulgated regulations barring students from
working without a showing of financial necessity and special permission
from the INS District Director.98 The following year, it promulgated regula-
tions similarly barring visitors from working without permission.99
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
which included various new "nonimmigrant" visa categories for noncitizens
coming to the United States for a temporary period of time to engage in a
specific activity.1 00 Among these were a new H visa for temporary guest
workers, which, like the Bracero program, limited the visa holders to
working for particular employers.10 1 In addition, the 1952 Act revised the
contract laborer ground of exclusion, which, since 1885, had prohibited the
admission of contract laborers but allowed the importation of "skilled labor,"
provided that it could not be obtained in the United States. 102 According to
the House Report accompanying the bill, the Contract Labor provision was
being replaced in order to better protect American labor with a new, more
robust provision. 10 3 In particular, the new provision excluded:
95. See Juan Carlos Linares, Hired Hands Needed: The Impact of Globalization and Human Rights
Law on Migrant Workers in the United States, 34 DENy. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 321, 330 (2006).
96. Id. at 331; NGAI, supra note 48 at 71 75; KANSTROOM, supra note 54 at 215.
97. See Linares, supra note 95 at 330 31.
98. INS Rule for Nonquota Immigrant Students, 12 Fed. Reg. 5355, 5357 (Aug. 7, 1947) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 125).
99. INS Rule for Aliens Coming to the United States as Visitors, 13 Fed. Reg. 2643, 2644 (Feb. 26,
1948) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 119).
100. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, § 101(a)(15) (1952)
(defining "immigrant" as "every alien except an alien who is within ... [various enumerated] classes
of nonimmigrant aliens").
101. See Griffith, Migrant Worker Law, supra note 7, at 131 38.
102. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 136(h) (1946) (allowing for the importation of skilled labor upon
application to the Attorney General and after a hearing on the question of whether labor "of like kind
unemployed cannot be found in this country").
103. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 50-51 (1952).
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Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing
skilled or unskilled labor, if the Secretary of Labor has determined and
certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A)
sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, and
qualified are available at the time (of application for a visa and for
admission to the United States) and place (to which the alien is
destined) to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, or (B) the employ-
ment of such aliens will adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.104
However, the provision only applied to two categories: (1) immigrants
who were subject to annual per-country quotas who were not part of several
priority categories, such as those with extraordinary ability or close family
relationships to citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents ("LPRs"); or (2)
certain specified classes of immigrants who were exempt from annual quotas,
including, most relevantly, nationals of the Western Hemisphere "other than
parents, spouses, or children of the United States citizens or LPRs."
' 10 5
Moreover, the provision included a potential waiver, by which the Attorney
General could waive application of the provision if the Attorney General
determined that their services were "needed urgently in the United States
because of the high education technical training, specialized experience, or
exceptional ability of such immigrants" and it would "be substantially
beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interest, or welfare
of the United States" to admit them. 1
0 6
The most significant result of this provision was that Western Hemisphere
nationals (including Mexican citizens) could be barred under the 1952 INA
from entering the United States to work if the Secretary of Labor certified
that there was not a need for their labor, unless they had an immediate family
member who was a United States citizen or LPR. 10 7 Thus, the 1952 INA, like
earlier immigration reforms, continued to regulate the supply of domestic
labor through immigration; immigrant laborers could be excluded in order to
protect the domestic labor market. Yet the 1952 Act did nothing to prevent
immigrants from working once they were inside the United States.
The 1952 INA, however, also authorized the Attorney General to promul-
gate regulations as necessary to implement the INA. l08 The INS afterward
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1952).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(14) (1952); 8 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (1952); 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(27)(C), (D),
and (E) (1952).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(14)(1952). See also 8 C.F.R. § 212(a)(1952) (setting out procedures for
seeking the waiver).
107. If a noncitizen entered for a bona fide purpose other than to work and then later began
working, the INS did not take enforcement action against the noncitizen. See Sam Bernsen, Leave to
Labor, 52 INTERP. REL. 291, 299 (1975).
108. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, §§ 101 (a)(15) and 103 (1952)
(§ 101 defines new nonimmigrant categories and § 103 authorizes the AG to promulgate regulations
as necessary to implement the Act).
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used this authority to promulgate regulations that restricted employment for
any nonimmigrant that was "inconsistent with and not essential to the status
under which he is in the United States unless such activity has first been
authorized by the district director or the officer in charge having administra-
tive jurisdiction over the alien's place of temporary residence in the United
States."109
The new regulation on nonimmigrant work expanded upon the INS's
earlier regulation of work by tourists and students, and solidified the legal
authority for doing so by relying on the INA provision authorizing the
Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement the INA.110 The
new regulations did not square well with the Court's earlier immigrant
right-to-work jurisprudence. However, the regulations were not legally
challenged, perhaps because they were rarely enforced and, when they were,
the temporary visa holders to whom they applied lacked the resources or
ability to contest them. In addition, the 1950s were a period of low
immigration and reduced societal support for immigrants. 111 Finally, the end
of the Lochner era also ushered in a growing legal consensus in favor of an
empowered administrative state. 
112
By the late 1950s, the INS had begun to deport a modest number of
nonimmigrants who had worked without permission.'1 13 It distributed a form
to entering nonimmigrants stating that they could not work without permis-
sion, but the INS did not have a formal process for granting work permits. 
114
In the absence of any official work permit, the INS marked some noncitizens'
1-94 Arrival/Departure Records with a statement that the noncitizens were
eligible to seek employment. 115
The INS developed more policies concerning nonimmigrant employment
over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. For example, it took the position that
noncitizens with student visas were not banned by statute from working, but
109. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(c) (1952).
110. Another authority for at least regulating the work of tourists and temporary business visitors
was the new definition of those categories contained in the INA, which specified that they did not
include "an alien ... coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or unskilled labor ..
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1952).
111. Douglas S. Massey, The New Immigration and Ethnicity in the United States, 21 Pop. & DEV.
REV. 631, 635 (1995).
112. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1266-67 (1986).
113. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 7 (1959) (reporting that 39,016 nonimmigrants
violated the terms of their admission most "by engaging in unauthorized employment or... remain-
ing beyond the period of authorized stay"); Matter of S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 574, 575 (B.I.A. 1960).
114. In 1960, the INS informed entering nonimmigrants that they could not work using Form
1-358. Matter of S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 574, 575 (B.I.A. 1960).
115. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 7 (1959) (reporting that 39,016 nonimmigrants
violated the terms of their admission most "by engaging in unauthorized employment or... remain-
ing beyond the period of authorized stay"); Matter of S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 574, 575 (B.I.A. 1960).
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restricted student work based on labor market conditions.1 6 It allowed
on-campus work without restrictions, and from the 1950s through 1974
allowed off-campus summer work on an annual basis after consulting with
the Labor Department. l 7 After 1974, it allowed off-campus work only on a
case-by-case basis following a showing of economic necessity or a need for
practical training. 1 8 Furthermore, INS District Directors varied considerably
in how they handled students' applications for work permission during this
time period. 1 9
In addition to nonimmigrants and immigrants (green card holders), there
were a number of other categories of noncitizens during this time period,
such as unauthorized immigrants and those paroled into the country as the
contemporary equivalent of refugees. 120 These noncitizens certainly worked,
and there was no legal authority making it illegal for them to do S.121
Although unauthorized immigrants could be deported for entering without
inspection, working without permission did not create any additional penalty
for them. 122 Moreover, the INS gave I-94s stamped to show work authoriza-
tion to some undocumented immigrants in the 1970s, such as those who were
waiting for their applications or petitions for lawful status to be granted. 123
In 1965, Congress substantially amended the INA. 124 The most significant
change was to eliminate the former system of national origin quotas that had
been intentionally designed in 1924 to maintain a predominately white,
Western European immigrant pool. 125 In place of the national origin quotas,
Congress created new quotas of 20,000 visas per country per year that were
the same for every country in the Eastern Hemisphere. 126 For the Western
Hemisphere, Congress imposed a cap of 120,000 visas to be divided by
demand. 127
One other significant change that Congress made in 1965 was to tighten
the grounds for excluding noncitizens seeking admission to perform labor. Its
1952 act had allowed the exclusion of noncitizens seeking admission to
perform work if the Secretary of Labor certified that there were sufficient
workers in the United States to perform the job at issue or that the
116. Bernsen, supra note 107, at 292 94.
117. Id. at292 93.
118. Id. at 293 94.
119. Id. at 300.
120. The Refugee Act was not passed until 1980, but the United States paroled in thousands of
persons for humanitarian reasons from the 1950s up until 1980. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION
OUTSIDE THE LAW 25 (2014).
121. See Wishnie, supra note 12, at 198 99 (explaining that prior to IRCA's passage, there were no
criminal penalties for employers who hired unauthorized workers and no additional penalties for
unauthorized workers who worked).
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1958).
123. Bernsen, supra note 107, at 294 95.
124. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
125. NGAI, supra note 48, at 227.
126. Id. at 258.
127. Id.
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employment of the noncitizen would adversely affect wages or working
conditions in the United States.128 The amended provision allowed admis-
sion only if the Secretary of Labor certified that there were not sufficient
laborers in the United States to perform the work at issue or that the
employment of the noncitizen would not adversely affect wages or working
conditions.129 Thus, the 1965 amendments, like earlier reforms, focused on
using immigration laws to control the domestic labor supply. They did not
contain any limitations on immigrants' ability to work once in the country.
B. The 1970s-1990s: The Illusion of a Comprehensive System
Although Congress and the Agency tinkered around the edges of immi-
grant work regulations from the 1940s through the 1960s, there was no
comprehensive system until the late 1970s. The creation of such a system
coincided with Congress' and the public's growing obsession with the
phenomenon of so-called "illegal aliens." As Professor Mae Ngai has
persuasively shown, the legal and cultural category of "illegal alien" as it
currently exists was partly created by public policies during this time period
that dramatically curtailed legal Mexican immigration. 
130
In 1964, Congress repealed the Bracero program, which had been admit-
ting about 200,000 Mexican Braceros per year. 131 Although the H2A guest
worker visa program remained, the number of H2A workers was never
sufficient to meet the labor needs of the United States economy. 132 Exacerbat-
ing the sudden disjuncture between the needs of the labor market and the
amount of legal Mexican immigration, in 1968 Congress, imposed a numeri-
cal quota for the first time on Western Hemisphere immigration. 133 The total
number of Western Hemisphere immigrants permitted was 120,000-
considerably less than the annual number of Mexican Braceros entering just a
few years earlier. 134 In 1976, Congress further estricted Mexican immigra-
tion by imposing an annual quota of 20,000 on each Western Hemisphere
country, including Mexico. 
135
The United States economy, however, had not substantially reduced its
need for labor. As a result, illegal immigration from Mexico surged. The
number of deportations of undocumented Mexicans increased by forty
percent in 1968 (the year the 120,000 quota for the Western Hemisphere was
implemented) to 151,000.136 In 1976, the year the 20,000 country quota for
128. See Pesikoff v. Sec'y of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
129. Id.
130. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 48, at 261.
131. Linares, supra note 95, at 333.
132. For a discussion of the H visa and other temporary work visa programs, see Griffith, Migrant
Worker Law, supra note 7, at 130 38.
133. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, supra note 48, at 258.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 261.
136. Id.
2017]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
Mexico was implemented, the INS expelled 781,000 Mexicans from the
United States. 137 Meanwhile, the total number of apprehensions for all other
nationals in the world combined remained below 100,000 per year. 13"
One obvious policy solution to this problem would have been to revise the
immigration quota for Mexico and other countries with historically high
emigration to the United States so that they better reflected the country's need
for foreign labor. Instead, a consensus view emerged among policymakers
that illegal immigration should be combatted by restricting unauthorized
migrants' access to work. 139 Bills were unsuccessfully introduced throughout
the 1970s to penalize employers who hired unauthorized immigrant work-
ers. 140 This legislation incorrectly presumed that there was a comprehensive
system in place for limiting or authorizing immigrant work. 141 For example,
in 1971, the Nixon administration introduced legislation prohibiting the
employment of noncitizens "who are illegally in the United States or are in an
immigration status in which such employment is not authorized."142 The bill
did not pass,143 but if it had, it would have left the agency scrambling to
develop a more comprehensive employment authorization system.
In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act to require certain
measures concerning social security numbers for noncitizens.144 It was
driven by a concern that unauthorized immigrants were seeking to obtain
social security numbers, which was lawful at the time. 145 In 1974, the Social
Security Administration ("SSA") promulgated new regulations implement-
ing the recent amendments to the Social Security Act.146 Under the new
regulations, the SSA was authorized to issue numbers to citizens, LPRs, or
persons "under other authority of law permitting them to engage in employ-
ment in the United States."147 Again, policymakers wrongly assumed that
there already existed some legal framework comprehensively addressing
employment authorization for noncitizens.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Final Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint
Hearings, Open. Statement of Hon. Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Policy 8 (1981) (identifying the United States labor market as the primary pull factor for
illegal immigration and calling for "sanctions against employers who hire and exploit illegal aliens,
plus some new method to verify work authorization.").
140. Wishnie, supra note 12, at 199 202.
141. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 61 (1976) (noting, in striking down California's
effort to criminally punish employers who hired undocumented workers, that the INA did not concern
itself with regulating the hiring of immigrant workers).
142. H.R. 2328 § 26 (1971).
143. JEFFREY TOGMAN, THE RAMPARTS OF NATIONS: INSTITUTIONS AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, 52-53 (2002).
144. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 64 Stat. 518, § 137 (1972).
145. See Sen. Rep. No. 92-1230, Social Security Amendments Act of 1972, Report of the
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, to Accompany H.R. 1, 92nd Cong. 2d Session, Sept. 26,
1972, 160.
146. 20 C.F.R. § 422.104 (1974).
147. Id. Those not authorized to work could be issued cards "only for a non-work purpose."
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Also in 1974 Congress passed the Farm Labor Contractor Registration
Amendments Act, which prohibited farm labor contractors from facilitating
the hiring of any noncitizen "not lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
or who has not been authorized by the Attorney General to accept employ-
ment."148 Two years later, Congress not only imposed the 20,000 quota on
Mexican immigration, but also barred noncitizens who "continue[d] in or
accept[ed] unauthorized employment" from obtaining lawful permanent
residence in the United States.149 Yet Congress did not specify in the
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976 who could legally
work in the United States, nor had the INS yet done so through regulations.
In response to the 1976 Act, and in an environment of rapidly escalating
immigration enforcement against Mexican nationals, the Agency began to try
to systematically regulate noncitizen employment. It published notice of a
draft regulation concerning work authorization, stating that Congress had
recognized its authority to do so by banning noncitizens who were unauthor-
ized to work from adjusting status. 15 0 The proposed regulation was relatively
simple; it authorized noncitizens to file an employment authorization applica-
tion in three circumstances: if the noncitizen (1) held valid nonimmigrant
status and was otherwise authorized by the regulations to seek work; (2) had
,.a prima facie claim of entitlement to a benefit-which, if granted, would
make him eligible to remain permanently or indefinitely in the United
States"; or (3) had "been granted permission to remain in the United States
for an indefinite or extended period of time by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service." 
151
After President Reagan took office in 1980, the INS issued another
proposed regulation, eschewing the simple approach in the earlier regulation
for a cumbersome list of categories of noncitizens eligible to work. 152 With
some modifications, the regulation was finalized in 198 1.153 After forty years
of incrementally chipping away at the immigrant right to work, the INS now
explicitly repudiated it in the new regulatory language. In the new regula-
tion's preamble, the INS stated that "[e]mployment in the United States is not
an inherent right" but, rather, "a matter of administrative discretion .... 4
148. 5 Farm Labor Contractor Registration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 93-518 § 11, 88 Stat.
1652, 1655 (1974).
149. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571 § 6, 90 Stat. 2703,
2706 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)); 44 Fed. Reg. 43,480 (Jul. 25, 1979).
150. INS, Proposed Rules for Employment Authorization for Certain Aliens, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,480
(July 25, 1979) (Reserved 8 CFR Part 109).
151. Id.
152. INS, Employment Authorization, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,563 (Mar. 26, 1980) (Reserved 8 CFR
109).
153. Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079, 25,080 81
(May 5, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109) (distinguishing classes of aliens who receive work
authorization as a condition of their admission from others who must apply for work authorization
separately).
154. Id. at 25,080.
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There was no statutory authority for this language, which was directly
contrary to the holding of the earlier right-to-work cases, like Yick Wo. As
statutory authority for the regulation, the INS cited only the general provision
of the INA authorizing the Attorney General to engage in rulemaking "as he
deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this
chapter."
15 5
Still, the new work permission regulation authorized a grant of work
permission even for many noncitizens who lacked formal legal status, but
whose presence in the United States was allowed as a matter of administra-
tive discretion.1 5 6 Moreover, the regulation said nothing about what would
happen to noncitizens who did work without permission, or to employers
who hired them. 157
The same year that the INS published this employment authorization
regulation, Congress's Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy released a report summarizing its multi-year study of immigration. 1 5 8
The report focused heavily on the issue of illegal immigration. 159 It recom-
mended a multi-prong strategy to combat illegal immigration, including
increased enforcement, employer sanctions, a legalization program for unau-
thorized migrants in the United States, and a temporary guest worker
program. 160
Congress eventually acted on these recommendations when it passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), in 1986.161 "IRCA con-
tained a new provision specifying that an 'unauthorized alien' for purposes of
work was a noncitizen who is neither an LPR nor 'authorized to be... em-
ployed by this chapter or by the Attorney General."'' 162 The provision thus
ratified the INS's pre-existing practice of administratively deciding which
categories of noncitizens could lawfully work.163 In this regulatory M6bius
strip, a noncitizen authorized to work was essentially anyone whom the INS
said was authorized to work.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
156. See 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4) (6) (1982) (allowing work authorization for noncitizens with
"voluntary departure," "deferred action," and "parole").
157. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984).
158. U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations
of the Select Comm'n on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commission-
ers, 97th Cong, 1st Sess. (Mar 1, 1981) ("Select Commission Report").
159. Id. at 35.
160. Id. at 11-13.
161. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 115, 274A, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360, 3384 (making employment of unauthorized immigrants unlawful and increasing
enforcement of existing immigration laws).
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1324(a)(h)(3) (1988).
163. See Employment Authorization; Classes of Aliens Eligible, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,092, 46,093
(Dec. 4, 1987) (to be codified 8 C.F.R. pt. 109) (rejecting a petition asking the INS to rescind its
employment authorization regulation and rejecting an argument that "the phrase 'authorized to be so
employed by this Act or the Attorney General' does not recognize the Attorney General's authority to
grant work authorization except to those aliens who have already been granted specific authorization
by the Act").
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IRCA also included new employer sanctions provisions. Until IRCA, it
had not been illegal for employers to hire immigrants without work authori-
zation; Congress had issued the so-called "Texas Proviso" to clarify that
hiring an undocumented immigrant did not violate the federal harboring
statute. 164 Under IRCA, prospective employees were required to complete a
"Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification," attesting to their work
eligibility. 165 Employers were required to verify eligibility by consulting
certain documents, and certifying that the documents reasonably appeared to
be genuine and to relate to the individual. 166
The purpose of the new employer sanctions provision was twofold: to
reduce illegal immigration and to protect the domestic labor market from
competition by unauthorized migrants.167 However, enforcement of em-
ployer sanctions was spotty and seemed to grow even weaker over the course
of the first couple decades after IRCA's passage. 168 Rather than reducing
illegal immigration, the number of unauthorized migrants in the United
States tripled after IRCA. 
169
Moreover, instead of protecting United States citizen-workers from unfair
competition, this legislation merely "granted to employers an enormous,
coercive power over their noncitizen workers and over low-wage U.S.
workers who compete with them."170 The IRCA sanctions have been an
insufficient deterrent for many employers who have an economic incentive to
hire unauthorized workers due to the their inability to demand higher wages
or better workplace conditions without risking deportation. This incentive
has been enhanced by the Supreme Court's finding that unauthorized workers
could not recover backpay for employers' labor law violations,17 1 which
further limited unauthorized workers' recourse against employers' unfair
labor practices. 
172
Despite the failure of IRCA to achieve its twin purposes, policymakers did
not abandon the course Congress had embarked on with IRCA. Instead,
Congress doubled down by attempting to develop better methods for employ-
ers to verify employment eligibility. In 1996, Congress ordered the INS to
conduct three pilot programs to determine the best method of verifying an
employee's employment authorization. 173 One of these programs was the
"Basic Pilot Program," under which voluntarily participating employers
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1982).
165. Griffith, Migrant Worker Law, supra note 7 at 139.
166. Id.
167. Wishnie, supra note 12, at 202.
168. Id. at 209 (noting a decline in IRCA enforcement hroughout the 1990s, and through 2005).
169. Id. at 206.
170. Id. at 205.
171. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
172. Wishnie, supra note 12, at 213 14.
173. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104 208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (amended 1996).
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called the SSA to check information from a form that the employee is
required to fill out concerning her immigration status, called an "1-9 form,"
against SSA records. 174 Once the SSA information was confirmed by phone,
the employer entered 1-9 data into a computer program that was sent to the
INS by modem. 
175
Eighteen years later, the program has outlasted its generic name, bureau-
cratic implementation, and opposition from both industry and civil liberty
organizations. It is now called "E-Verify" and boasts over 600,000 participat-
ing employers. 176 Proposed immigration reforms frequently include manda-
tory participation in the program for all employers, so something like
E-Verify could come to dominate the future of immigrant labor. This would
mark a 180-degree turn from the Yick Wo era. Contradicting the Supreme
Court's earlier recognition that work is a fundamental right, E-Verify heralds
a future of technocratic policing of work in service of a Sisyphean project of
immigration enforcement.
IV. THE PUTATIVE ILLEGALITY OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT WORK
Immigration laws today primarily address the issue of immigrant labor
through statutory provisions that aim to limit the admission of immigrant
workers in order to protect the jobs or wages of domestic workers.
17 7
Compared to this system for regulating the admission of noncitizen workers,
the laws that address the ability of noncitizens already residing in the United
States to work are sparse and equivocal. 178 On the whole, they do not prohibit
unauthorized work, but restrict it by limiting unauthorized workers' access to
jobs and labor rights. 179 As a result, most people assume that unauthorized
work is illegal-not because it is, but because unauthorized workers are
treated as if they had done something illegal. 180 The putative illegality of
174. For a copy of the form, see Employment Eligibility Verification, USCIS, https://www.uscis.
gov/i-9 (last visited Apr 9, 2017).
175. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, E-Verify: History and Milestones,
USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-program/history-and-milestones (last visited Apr 9,
2017).
176. Id. For a discussion of E-Verify, see Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares
About E-Verify (and Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381, 382 (2012).
177. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (allowing for the admission of temporary workers
engaged in specialty occupations); 1101(a)(15)(I) (admission of journalists); 1101(a)(15)(J) (ex-
change visitors, including workers); 1101(a)(15)(L) (executive transferees); 1101(a)(15)(O) (aliens
of extraordinary ability); 1101(a)(15)(P) (artists and entertainers); 1101(a)(15)(R) (religious work-
ers); 1182(a)(5) (describing the "labor certification" process), 1182(n)(2)(G) (authorization investiga-
tions of employers in violation of the H visa requirements); 1188 (labor certification process for the
admission of H-2A agricultural workers).
178. See infra Part III.B.
179. Id.
180. For a discussion of the criminalization of immigrants, see Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career
of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965,
21 LAW & HisT. REV. 69, 7 (2003).
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immigrant work has allowed a system that was designed to regulate employ-
ers to become a means for exploiting immigrant workers.
A. Immigration Regulation to Control the Labor Market
United States immigration law sets out the grounds for admitting nonciti-
zens into the United States.181 There are a variety of temporary visa
categories, including several that are specifically for temporary workers. 
182
Some of these categories are subject to a "labor certification" process. 
183
The antecedents to this process date to 1885, when the United States
barred the admission of "contract labor" and only allowed the importation of
immigrant laborers if there were not enough native workers to fill the job. 
184
The 1952 and 1965 amendments to this law establish the essential structure
of the current labor certification process.185 According to this system,
employers may not petition for the admission of most skilled and unskilled
workers unless the Department of Labor has certified that there are not
enough workers in the United States to do the work and that their admission
will not adversely affect the wages of American workers.186 The labor
certification process serves a longstanding goal of United States immigration
policy: assuring the existence of sufficient workers to meet economic needs
while also protecting the jobs of domestic workers. 
187
B. Immigration Law Creates Some Qualified Penalties for Unauthorized
Work but Does Not Explicitly Prohibit It
The above system for deciding who gets into the United States in the first
place must be distinguished from the question of what rights noncitizens
have who are present in the country. When it comes to work, the INA defines
an "unauthorized alien" as "(A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the
Attorney General." 1 88 The second half of the above definition is implemented
through regulations enumerating the categories of noncitizens authorized to
work or to seek work permission.18 9 However, neither the statute nor
181. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15) (setting out various visa categories); 1182 (setting out categories of
inadmissible noncitizens).
182. See supra note 177.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5).
184. Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (amended 1887).
185. For the text of these provisions and a discussion of them, see Pesikoff v. Sec'y of Labor, 501
F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5). The labor certification process applies to second preference (Profes-
sionals Holding Advanced Degrees and Persons of Exceptional Ability) and third preference (Skilled
Workers, Professionals, and Unskilled Workers) categories of employment-based admissions, mean-
ing that priority workers, "special immigrants" and immigrant investors are exempt. For the labor
certification requirements, see 20 C.F.R. § 656.24.
187. See Digilab, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir. 1974).
188. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (1952).
189. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2017).
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regulations set out a clear penalty for "unauthorized aliens" who work.1 90
In the instances where the INA addresses immigrant work, it does so in a
qualified manner. First, the INA is explicit that nonimmigrant "B visas" for
tourism or business are unavailable to persons "coming for the purpose
of... performing skilled or unskilled labor" and these visa holders can be
deported for working.1 91 However, Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") regulations do actually authorize B visa holders to work in some
situations. 192
Second, noncitizens who work without authorization may in some situa-
tions be ineligible for other benefits under the INA. 193 For asylum seekers,
unauthorized work is considered tantamount to "unlawful presence" and can
lead to a bar on future admission to the United States, although this bar only
becomes effective if the asylum seeker loses or abandons her asylum
application, leaves, and later attempts to return. 
194
Perhaps the most significant immigration complication arising from unau-
thorized work is that noncitizens who work without authorization are
ineligible for adjustment of status-a process for obtaining a green card from
within the United States.195 However, there is an exception to this principle
for "immediate relatives" (spouses, parents, and children) of United States
citizens and certain "special immigrants."196 Moreover, this penalty for
unauthorized work is often beside the point, because noncitizens who entered
without inspection are already ineligible for adjustment of status and gener-
ally must return to their country of origin to "consular process" in order to
obtain a green card. 
197
Thus, the legally mandated penalties specifically for unauthorized work
are limited. Unauthorized workers who are unlawfully present in the United
States do face a significant immigration consequence as a result of that
unlawful presence: they can be deported. However, that consequence is
collateral to working, not because of it.
C. State Policies Limiting Immigrant Work
Although unauthorized work is not per se illegal as a matter of federal law,
some states have created an environment hostile to immigrant work. Many
190. Id.
191. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(B); 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).
192. See 8 C.ER. § 274a.12(c)(17) (authorizing work for B visa holders who are domestic servants
of certain nonimmigrants or US citizens with a permanent home in another country, and for certain
employees of foreign airlines).
193. See U.S.C. § 112(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II) (treating work as unlawful presence for asylum seekers);
U.S.C. § 1255(c) (making noncitizens who work without authorization ineligible in many cases for
adjustment of status).
194. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II) (2012).
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (2012).
196. Id.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012) (providing for adjustment of status for an "alien who was inspected
and admitted or paroled into the United States.").
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states have licensing standards that restrict noncitizens' ability to pursue
certain occupations. 198 About half the states in the country sued the Obama
administration over its effort to authorize the work of some immigrants who
otherwise lacked legal immigration status.199 As set out in Part II, the
phenomenon of states attempting to limit immigrant work has a long
tradition. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts mostly
struck down those laws as violating a substantive immigrant right to work.20 0
Later, courts became more likely to invalidate them as violating equal
protection; today, preemption is often the analysis of choice.20 1 For example,
Arizona and Alabama have attempted in recent years to make unauthorized
work a criminal offense, but courts have found that such efforts are pre-
empted by IRCA.20 2
D. Unauthorized Workers Are Relegated to Precarious Work
In the end, the most serious impediments to immigrant work come from
laws that limit unauthorized immigrant workers' employment opportunities
rather than prohibiting them. 2 3 IRCA employer sanctions provisions and
E-Verify are the most notable of these. E-Verify continues to gain steam and
although participation is voluntary at the federal level, a number of states
have mandated its use by at least some employers.20 4
Employers who do not participate in E-Verify must still confirm that a
worker is not an "unauthorized alien" by checking certain documents before
hiring the employee, such as a Social Security Card.20 5 Unless noncitizens
use a false Social Security Card or other false documents to obtain work, they
do not face a penalty under IRCA if an employer hires them. 2 6 Nonetheless,
it is the unauthorized worker who often bears the brunt of the violation.
198. For a discussion of state occupational licensing requirements on noncitizens, see Michael A.
Olivas, How Did We Get Here? Undocumented and DACAmented Lawyers and Occupational
Licensing, 52 VALPARAISO L. REV. (2017, forthcoming).
199. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 179 86 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 579 U.S. -- (2016).
200. See note 84, supra.
201. See note 78, supra. Preemption is a doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause to the United
States Constitution, providing that state regulation of a subject can be preempted when there is a
conflicting federal statute or a comprehensive regulatory scheme. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
202. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (finding a provision making it unlawful for an unauthorized
migrant to knowingly apply for or perform work in Arizona to be preempted by federal law); United
States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) (same).
203. Once in removal proceedings, unauthorized mployment can be banned as a condition of
release on bond. See I.N.S. v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)
(rejecting facial statutory challenge to INS regulation allowing for a ban on acceptance of
unauthorized employment as a condition of bond).
204. See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering "Immployment" Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 389, 390. (2011).
205. See note 176, supra.
206. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a), (f).
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Employers who violate IRCA face civil fines as low as $100.207 By contrast,
an unauthorized migrant risks deportation and possibly permanent separation
from her family, home, and life in the United States-not because he or she
worked but because he or she drew attention to his or her unauthorized
presence by working. These disparate stakes contribute to the putative
illegality of unauthorized immigrant work. Because unauthorized immi-
grants bear the steeper penalty, they are perceived as the more culpable
party-as the ones who have "stolen" the jobs of citizens.20 8
Noncitizens who are unauthorized to work cannot legally obtain a Social
Security Card that satisfies IRCA requirements for an employer to hire
them.20 9 However, it is possible to work and pay taxes without a Social
Security Number.2 10 Thus, unauthorized workers can be self-employed, and
many are.2 11 In addition, employers can hire "sporadic, irregular, or intermit-
tent" domestic workers without checking their immigration status.2 12 Most
significantly, employers need not check the immigration status of indepen-
dent contractors they retain to perform work for them.2 13
These categories of contingent work comprise a large, and growing share
of the overall United States economy.2 14 In many sectors of the economy,
such as landscaping and construction, it is common to characterize (or
mischaracterize) workers as independent contractors. This means that employ-
ers need not check immigration status, pay minimum wage, overtime, social
215security, Medicaid, or unemployment insurance taxes. Independent con-
tractors are unable to access the protections of most labor and employment
law, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, National Labor Relations Act,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Family Medical Leave Act, or Title
VII. 2 16 Such incentives to hire independent contractors lead to the fissuring
of the workplace and the degradation of employment security for all
207. Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 789 (2008).
An employer who engages in a pattern and practice of violations can be subject to the criminal
penalty of six months' incarceration. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1).
208. Daniel Morales, In Democracy's Shadow: Fences, Raids, and the Production of Migrant
Illegality, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 23, 65 (2009) ("Apart from reiterating the established link between
Mexicans and the criminal, employer sanctions also turned the workplace (which had formerly been
the location where immigrants, through sweat and toil 'earned' their social right to remain present in
the United States) into the locus of criminal endeavor and fraud. Work went from a marker of
belonging to a species of theft.").
209. 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2012).
210. Most persons have a Social Security number in order to report their taxes, because the
Internal Revenue Service requires that employers obtain an identification number from employees,
which is typically a Social Security Number. However, federal l w allows employers to use Taxpayer
Identification Numbers ("TIN") if employees are ineligible for a Social Security number. See 26
U.S.C. § 6109 (2012); 26 CFR 301.6109 1(a). Because unauthorized migrants can obtain TIN
numbers, they technically do not need a Social Security Number to legally work.
211. See Mastman, supra note 17 at 257.
212. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(h) (2009).
213. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (2009).
214. See supra note 13-15.
215. See WEIL, supra note 13 at 17-18.
216. Id.
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employees in the affected industries.
217
Thus, the primary impact of IRCA employer sanctions is not to make it
illegal for immigrants without work authorization to work, but to limit
unauthorized workers' employment opportunities and access to legal protec-
tions and benefits. They are restricted to self-employment, independent
contractor status, or the underground economy, where they earn less money,
are less likely to have work-provided benefits, and are more likely to live in
poverty.
218
In 2002 the Supreme Court announced, "Under the IRCA regime, it is
impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional poli-
cies. '2 19 Yet, unauthorized immigrant workers can legally be self-employed
or work as irregular domestic workers or independent contractors. A 2016
challenge filed by many states to a federal expansion of work authorization,
United States v. Texas, similarly reveals that this point is rarely understood.
No party in that case pointed out that unauthorized migrants could legally
work without being granted work authorization through the controversial
new federal program.220 The Court, states, and federal government all seem
to believe that there is a comprehensive statutory scheme in place to prohibit
and punish employment by unauthorized immigrant workers, rather than just
a set of measures to discourage employers from hiring them.
Perhaps part of the reason why there is no comprehensive statutory scheme
for regulating immigrant work is that at one time this country encouraged and
protected all immigrant work.221 The current system is a messy palimpsest
written over that earlier history. It is time to reconsider this system, which has
disrupted the labor market, caused hardship on immigrant families, and led to
arbitrary immigration enforcement without solving the underlying problem
of illegal immigration.2 22 The policy arguments for doing so have been ably
made by other commentators.2 23 Thus, the following section looks instead at
constitutional arguments for restoring the once widely accepted right of
immigrants to work to support themselves and their families.
V. RESUSCITATING IMMIGRANTS' RIGHT TO WORK?
In a country that accepts E-Verify, it may seem quixotic to attempt to
resurrect the right to work for noncitizens. The view that that the ability to
217. Id.
218. Government Accountability Office, supra note 15 at 5-6.
219. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002).
220. See Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. Texas, (March 1, 2016) (No. 15-674); Brief for
the Respondents, United States v. Texas, (March 2, 2016) (No. 15-674); Reply Brief of Petitioners,
United States v. Texas, (April 11, 2016) (No. 15-674).
221. See Part I, supra.
222. See Wishnie, supra note 12.
223. See id.; Griffith, Migrant Worker Law, supra note 7, at 140; Stephen Lee, Private Immigra-
tion Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1119 (2009); Pham, supra note 207.
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work is a privilege to be granted by Congress or the Executive has become
thoroughly entrenched. Yet the hegemony of this principle does not mean that
it is legitimate or wise. We have seen that the current system arose largely
through incremental regulation and became ntrenched in the wake of 1970s
reforms that virtually assured a perpetual campaign of deportation against
Latin American migrants. With IRCA, Congress finally lent its stamp of
approval to a system of work authorization it believed to be comprehensive,
but which in fact was far from it.
The current views concerning immigrant work are myopic. Looking back,
the right of immigrants to work is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.2 24 As a result, restrictions of the right should trigger
robust review under the Due Process Clause.225 The precise standard of
review is beyond the scope of this Article, as is an analysis of the complete
ramifications of resuscitating immigrants' right to work. The point here is to
discuss whether the right still exists.
The constitutional argument for a right to work faces formidable hurdles,
such as the post-West Coast Hotel reluctance of the Court to apply more than
cursory review to economic regulation and the extraordinary deference the
Court grants Congress and the executive branch in immigration matters.2 26
Yet once these problematic doctrines are overcome, there are strong theoreti-
cal reasons for restoring the constitutional right to work. This discussion aims
to renew debate on this neglected topic.
A. Interpretative Methodology
There are a host of schools of constitutional interpretation. Some commen-
tators and judges advocate a "Living Constitution" that changes with the
times.22 7 Others urge an "originalist" approach that looks either to the
intentions of the founders or the public understanding of the text at the time
of ratification.228 As a general matter, originalists are suspicious of substan-
tive due process.22 9 Yet the search for historicity that is the hallmark of
originalism has had an impact on the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court articulated a test for
expanding the rights protected by substantive due process that examines
224. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
225. There is also a right to work under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2 of
the Constitution. See Jonathan Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev.
487, 491 (1981). However, that clause is limited to citizens and only protects against state
discrimination. See United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden,
465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984).
226. See Part IV.B and C, infra.
227. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
228. D.A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing, 42 OHIO N. L. REV. 529 (2016);
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
7, 9 (2006).
229. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 389 (2012).
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whether the right is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.
230
In its most recent substantive due process decision, Obergefell v. Hodges,
the Court continued its reliance on historical inquiry, citing de Toqueville and
nineteenth century case law for the proposition that marriage is a fundamen-
tal right.2 31 However, it also cautioned that "[t]he generations that wrote and
ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to
know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to
future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty
as we learn its meaning.23 2 As a result, Obergefell rejected the second
element of the Glucksberg test-that there be "a 'careful description' of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.,233 The justices thus did not require
that a right to same-sex marriage be deeply rooted in United States history
and tradition, only that marriage itself be a fundamental right.234 In consider-
ing whether that right could be used to strike down restrictions on same-sex
marriage, they focused on considerations that had previously been confined
to equal protection cases. Because LGBT persons had suffered historical
discrimination, a majority concluded that there could be no deeply rooted
right to same-sex marriage.2 35 The Court thus blended an examination of the
historical pedigree of the right to marriage with a focus on whether LGBT
persons had experienced disrespect and subordination that prevented them
from accessing that right.236
Consistent with Glucksberg and Obergefell, this Part inspects whether an
immigrant right to work is deeply rooted in United States tradition and
whether noncitizens have experienced subordination. It draws upon the
substantial historical support for the right to work for immigrants set out in
Part II, and the reasons for its lapse, including animus against immigrants,
which are set out in Part III. Thus, the two aspects of the Glucksberg/
Obergefell analysis-historicity and subordination-support renewal of im-
migrants' right to work.
As a preliminary matter, two theoretical obstacles to this analysis must be
addressed: Lochnerism and the Plenary Power doctrine. Lochnerism refers to
the judicial consensus that arose in the wake of Lochner that any form of
strong judicial review of economic regulation amounts to judicial activism.
The Plenary Power doctrine refers to the judicial doctrine that federal
regulation of immigration should be given great deference. Although the two
230. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997).
231. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
232. Id. at 2598.
233. Id. at 2602.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2602 05.
236. Id. at 2604.
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together seem to present an insurmountable barrier to immigrants' right to
work, each gives way under closer scrutiny.
B. Lochnerism
Since West Coast Hotel, the Court has applied such a deferential form of
rational basis review to economic regulations that it has only rarely struck
down any legislation in the economic arena as a violation of due process.
2 37
This reluctance stems largely from the widespread view that the era's
decisions amounted to judicial activism-an invention of economic rights
that were not in the Constitution, in order to support "an economic theory
which a large part of the country does not entertain.,238 According to both the
traditional and progressive views of Lochner, Supreme Court Justices "steeped
in laissez-faire economic theory" struck down "legislation that threatened to
burden corporations or disturb the existing economic hierarchy.,
239
There are several reasons why the charge of Lochnerism should not
undermine an argument for a right to work. First, recent scholarship has
questioned the traditional critique of Lochner.240 Revisionists have "traced
the main strands of Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence back to the
Jacksonian aversion to 'class' legislation, to the anti-slavery movement's
adulation of individual economic liberty as a constitutive element of human
freedom, and to the nation's traditional social contract vision of political
membership.24 1 One strand of Lochner revisionism holds that the Court was
engaged in a sincere, if at times anachronistic, effort to uphold core
constitutional values.24 2 It is likely no coincidence that the Court's search for
historicity frequently served the nation's increasingly voracious appetite for
labor-and often in a way that privileged capitalist interests over workers.
Yet the right to work, with its Lockean pedigree,243 was authentically tied to
the country's intellectual tradition.24
237. Levy, supra note 23.
238. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting). See generally Gary D. Rowe, Lochner
Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 221, 223 (1999).
239. Lindsay, supra note 61 at 56.
240. Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York, Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 404 (2005).
241. Lindsay, supra note 61, at 56.
242. David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (2003) (the Lochner Court "had a generally
historicist outlook, seeking to discover the content of fundamental rights through an understanding of
which rights had created and advanced liberty among the Anglo-American people.").
243. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
244. David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 211, 282 83 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Chinese Laundry Cases] ("Lochnerian judges relied
on two long-standing American intellectual traditions that heavily influenced American conceptions
of liberty and the proper role of government in the post-bellum era: the tradition that valued 'natural
rights' and 'free labor,' and the tradition that opposed 'class legislation' legislation that benefits
politically powerful interest groups at the expense of other citizens."); William E. Forbath, The
Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the GildedAge, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 767, 799 (1985).
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Thus, revisionist scholarship suggests hat the Court's doctrinal aversion to
applying substantive due process analysis in the economic arena is not based
on a coherent set of principles.245 If the Court were to apply substantive due
process to laws that severely restrict work, the floodgates would not burst
open. In fact, the Court has been willing to enforce substantive due process in
recent years-both in the economic and private domains. One area in which
the Court has struck down economic regulation as violating substantive due
process is when it comes to excessive punitive damages awards. 6 The Court
has also continued to regularly apply substantive due process analysis in
analogous areas outside economic regulation, such as restrictions on the
fundamental right of marriage.24 7
Both marriage and work involve a "personal choice [that] ... is inherent in
the concept of individual autonomy.,248 Other than the choice of a life
partner, the choice of how to work is one of the most basic and personal
decisions in life. The fact that work is economic activity does not seem to be
a sufficient basis to distinguish it from the Court's recognition of other
analogous rights, like marriage, as fundamental for due process purposes.
Modern courts seem concerned that if they recognize economic rights as
being fundamental as a matter of substantive due process, it will reopen a
Pandora's box with no logical stopping point. However, there are principles
that could allow a court to strike down some restrictions on immigrant work
without logically requiring the invalidation of all labor law. The Court's
recent Obergefell decision provides a framework for doing so.
In Obergefell, the Court blended equal protection and due process review,
and looked to the historical subordination of LGBT persons as a basis for
recognizing a substantive due process right to gay marriage even in the
absence of any historical tradition of respecting such a right.249 As Professor
Kenji Yoshino points out, this "analysis of substantive due process inflected
with equality concerns ... constrains as well as expands the field of possible
liberties. 2 50 In other words, a linkage between equality principles and
substantive due process can act as a check on Lochnerism. Unlike workers
who may not wish to pay union dues or fees, immigrants have been subject to
a history of subordination both inside and outside the workforce. A denial of
their right to work does not just represent a minor economic hardship; it
typically results in greatly diminished or eviscerated employment options
245. Levy, supra note 23 at 331.
246. See Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (striking down a punitive damages
limit as in violation of the Due Process Clause); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408 (2003) (same); BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 599 (1996) (same).
247. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
248. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
249. Id.
250. Yoshino, supra note 26 at 175.
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and furthers immigrant subordination.2
Another reason to reject the charge of Lochnerism in this context is
international law. Justice Kennedy has been particularly willing to consult
international law in order to confirm "the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom.,25 2 International law has historically
provided support for a right to work: Justice Field, for example, quoted the
1776 edict of Louis XVI giving freedom to trades and professions to buttress
a finding that the right to work is rooted in natural law. 3 Many of the early
immigrant right-to-work cases relied on treaties between the United States
and China and Japan.254
International law today continues to support a right to work, even if that
right is not robustly enforced in practice. 5 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") includes a right to life, which impliedly
comes with a right to seek out the basic necessities of life, meaning, for most
persons, work. 6 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"),
which is a fundamental constitutive document of the United Nations, sets out
,.a right to work., 257 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("ICESR"), which the United States has signed but not
ratified, also contains a right to work.258 The right to work set out in these
provisions has been interpreted to mean a right to a job, not to nondiscrimina-
tory access to work. However, the UDHR and ICESR also provide that all
persons must be afforded equal protection with respect to their right to
work.
2 5 9
These international authorities have generally been met with ambivalence
in the United States, because they could imply increased government
interference with the labor market.260 Internationally, the right to work is
often not enforced, but that does not mean that it does not exist, or that it will
not eventually be vindicated over time.261 There is widespread recognition in
international law that nondiscriminatory access to employment is a human
right.26 2 This global consensus concerning the right to work shows that the
251. See Part IV.D, infra.
252. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
253. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746,
757 (1884) (Field, J., concurring).
254. Tim Wu, Treaties'Domains, 93 VA. L. REv. 571, 618 (2007).
255. See generally Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking
Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 363, 371 (2002).
256. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 6.
257. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 23, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
258. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. (1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
259. Harvey, supra note 255 at 380.
260. Id. at 383-84.
261. Id. at 382.
262. Id.
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core critique of Lochner-that judges struck down legislation based mostly
on their personal views of political economy-does not hold in this context.
Thus, international law, revisionist scholarship, and recent substantive due
process jurisprudence all refute the argument that an immigrant right to work
is mere Lochnerism.
C. The Plenary Power Doctrine
The Court has frequently adhered to a "plenary power" doctrine under
which it exercises extraordinary deference towards congressional or execu-
tive decisions over "immigration law," or decisions concerning the admission
or deportation of noncitizens.2 63 This doctrine first arose in 1889 in Chae
Chan Ping, or the Chinese Exclusion case, in which the Supreme Court
affirmed Congress's shameful exclusion of Chinese immigration into the
United States.2 64 The primary justification for the doctrine is the greater
competence of the political branches over questions of foreign affairs,265 and
it has been limited, for the most part, to cases involving federal decisions
about whom to admit or deport.26 6 In cases, on the other hand, involving the
rights of noncitizens in the United States, the Court has generally not applied
the plenary power doctrine.26 7 This is especially true in cases involving state
discrimination against noncitizens, particularly lawful residents, which have
even sometimes triggered strict scrutiny equal protection review.268 When
the federal government discriminates with respect to different types of
noncitizens, the Court has been much more likely to apply the plenary power
doctrine. It has even done so in at least one major case, Mathews v. Diaz,
which involved the allocation of benefits rather than decisions about admis-
sion and deportation.2 69
Therefore, a court is more likely to apply the plenary power doctrine to
federal discrimination concerning the right to work rather than state restric-
tions on the right. Moreover, whether the plenary power doctrine should
insulate federal work restrictions from review depends on whether those
rules are construed as "immigration law" or pertaining to the "more general
law of aliens' rights and obligations.270 In other words, if work restrictions
are connected closely enough to decisions concerning admission and depor-
263. For a discussion of the plenary power doctrine and its scope, see Adam B. Cox, Citizenship,
Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REv. 373, 379 (2004); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After A Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 256 (1984).
264. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
265. Id.
266. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 54 (2006).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
269. Matthews, 426 U.S. at 81 (1976) (applying rational basis review to evaluate federal
discrimination concerning the award of Medicare benefits to different categories of noncitizens).
270. Legomsky, supra note 263 at 256.
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tation, they are likely to fall under the plenary power doctrine. If they are
viewed as imposing on civil rights that transcend the limited context of
immigration decisions, they should fall outside the scope of plenary power.
Given the increasingly close connection between employment regulation
and immigration enforcement, an argument could be made for the application
of the plenary power doctrine in the area of employment regulation. The
argument would be that limitations on immigrants' right to work in the
United States are necessary to deter unauthorized immigration. In addition,
enlisting employers in checking work authorization aids the federal govern-
ment in deporting unauthorized immigrants. Limitation of immigrants' right
to work may not be, strictly speaking, in the area of admissions and
deportation, but it does have a close connection to admissions and removal.
One of the strongest reasons to reject such an argument is that the Supreme
Court did not apply the plenary power doctrine to cases involving immigrant
work during the era when it invented the doctrine. Justice Field was the
author of the Chinese Exclusion case, in which he used remarkably racist
language to affirm federal plenary power to exclude Chinese individuals.271
Yet, he repeatedly affirmed in other cases that immigrants-even Chinese
ones-had a right to work.2 72
Moreover, applying the plenary power doctrine in this context would be an
unwarranted extension of it. Accepting the historical right of immigrants to
work in the United States does not restrict the authority of the federal
government to limit admissions in order to regulate the labor market.
Immigrant rights doctrine traditionally distinguishes between "alienage"
cases involving the rights of noncitizens present in the United States, where
plenary power is at its weakest, and "immigration cases" involving admis-
sions and removal decisions, where the plenary power doctrine is at its
peak.273 There is no question that Congress has plenary power to require
noncitizens seeking to enter the country in order to work to comply with the
labor certification process described in Part IV. However, the current use of
employment authorization restrictions as a tool of immigration enforcement
is a distinct and more novel development, which conflicts with a long history
of accepting the right of all persons already present in the United States to
earn a livelihood.2 74
Ultimately, the primary rationale for the plenary power doctrine-the
greater competence of the political branches over foreign affairs-does not
271. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595 ("It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our
people, or to make any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year
the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded
millions of China, where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that at no
distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to
restrict their immigration.").
272. See In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
273. Legomsky, supra note 263.
274. See Part I, supra.
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apply to questions about who can work in the United States. The plenary power
doctrine should not limit judicial review of restrictions on immigrant work.
D. Historicity and Subordination
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court articulated a two-part test for
assessing whether a right is protected by substantive due process. First, the
test examines whether the right is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'
275
Second, it requires "a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest," meaning that there must be a history of recognizing the
specific right at issue, not some more general form of it.276 However, the
Court appeared to move away from the second requirement in Obergefell as
it found a right to gay marriage based on historical recognition of a general
right to marriage, not a specific right to gay marriage.277
There is ample support for finding a right to work that is deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition and "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." This support can be found in the nation's intellectual, cultural, and
legal history. The founders drew much of their political theory from the work
of John Locke.27 8 In particular, much of the Declaration of Independence was
based upon Locke's Treatise on Government.279 In the Second Treatise on
Government, Locke defended a natural right to property and defined property
by reference to labor.28 Work, according to Locke, is the basis for property,
and the justification for protecting a right to property.
281
American intellectual history has also been heavily influenced by the work
of Adam Smith, and the founders in particular may have been influenced his
views.282 James Madison, for example, was persuaded by Adam Smith's
275. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
276. Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
277. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
278. See DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 143 (LSU Press)
(1988).
279. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August 30, 1823), 15 THOMAS JEFFERSON,
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 462 (Andrew A. Lipscomb et al. eds., The Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association 1904).
280. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, § 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Inc. 1980) (1690).
281. For an argument that the Constitution should be interpreted as consistent with the Declaration
of Independence, see Harry V. Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the
Constitution of the United States?, 10 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 351, 365 66 (1987) (arguing that the right
to property "is the antecedent natural right grounded in natural equality that every person possesses in
himself. This right is a fortiori a right of each person to possess the fruit of his labor.").
282. Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith's Reception among the American Founders, 1776 1790,
59 WM. & MARY Q. 897, 905 (2002) ("There is good evidence that Jefferson, Hamilton, Wilson,
Adams, Webster, Morris, and the two James Madisons were some of his Smith's earliest readers and
among the first to take him seriously in their own political lives.").
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view of labor as being the foundation for all property.213 Like Locke, Smithbelieved in a close connection between labor, property, and liberty:
The property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.
The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his
own hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and
dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his
neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and
of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one
from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from
employing whom they think proper.284
This view was also highly influential with the nineteenth century jurists
who upheld the right to work for immigrants-Justice Field quoted the above
passage in his dissent in the 1884 Slaughterhouse Case.285
The centrality of the right to work in American culture has been recog-
nized by commentators from Benjamin Franklin to Max Weber.2 86 In the
United States, work seems to carry a unique moral and social force.2 87 Those
who do not work are viewed as immoral-lazy and shiftless-or as depen-
dent, lacking in autonomy.288 Jefferson and Madison believed that one's
character was influenced by the type of work one did, and that democracy
depended on the responsible judgment of economically independent yeoman
farmers.28 9 There is perhaps no other aspect of human activity that is more
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" than work.290
Throughout most of United States history, it has been assumed that
immigrants would be workers, and the value of their work to the growth and
success of the country has been widely recognized, even by those with
nativist or racist views.291 As detailed in Part I, United States courts
recognized a constitutional and natural law right to work for immigrants from
283. Id. at 906.
284. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, b. 1, ch.
10, part 2 (London: Methuen, 1904), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/237#Smith-0206-01-516.
285. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746,
757 (1884).
286. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 13-19 (Routledge 2001)
(discussing Benjamin Franklin and the view of work as a moral "calling").
287. See TERKEL, supra note 9.
288. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 17-19 (New York: Basic Books 10th ed. 1996).
289. See JAMES MADISON, JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 512 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1999).
290. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
291. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Mexicans, Immigrants, Cultural Narratives, and National Origin, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 316 (2012) (describing historical preferences of many employers for Mexican
laborers). See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 594 (1889) ("These [Chinese]
laborers readily secured employment, and, as domestic servants, and in various kinds of outdoor
work, proved to be exceedingly useful.").
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the 1870s through the early twentieth century.292 Since then, federal courts
have continued to strike down state restrictions on immigrant labor as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause-showing a persistent regard for
immigrant work, although without recognizing a right to such.2 93
There is also a strong moral and philosophical argument that an immigrant
right to work is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. As discussed above,
the liberal political theory on which the United States was founded clearly
upheld a universal right to work. The principle philosophical counterpoint to
liberalism comes from communitarianism.294 A communitarian critique of an
immigrant right to work might be that work is a privilege of formal
membership in the United States, not a universal right. Relegating the right to
members, this argument posits, is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
community by discouraging illegal immigration. That argument relies on an
empirical assumption that has proven false-that illegal immigration will be
discouraged by limiting access to work.2 95 In addition, Part IV clarifies that
unauthorized immigrants are able to legally work, but in jobs where their
access to legal protections are limited, such as independent contractor
positions or self-employment. Communitarians recognize that denying rights
to non-members undermines community by encouraging exploitation that
harms the community as a whole.2 96 One of the foremost communitarian
thinkers, Michael Walzer, argues for rigid border control but liberal rights
recognition in the interior, and recognizes that the subordination of nonciti-
zens is a form of tyranny. 297
There is therefore a very strong argument that immigrants' right to work
meets all elements of the Washington v. Glucksberg test. It is deeply rooted in
United States history, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and also
"carefully described" in the sense that American history not only reflects a
general right to work, but that immigrants themselves have been the benefi-
ciaries of that right. It is only in relatively recent history that the paradigm
concerning immigrant work has shifted. The conception of immigrant work
as putatively illegal and linked to immigration enforcement coincided with
the decision of policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s to dramatically curtail
legal Western Hemisphere immigration by initiating a massive campaign of
deportation against Latin American nationals in the United States and a
292. Part IB, supra.
293. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 5 (Michael J. Sandel
ed., 1984).
294. Id.
295. Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar
Crime, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1041, 1046 55, 1057, 1060 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2051 (2008) [hereinafter Motomura, Outside the Law];
Pham, supra note 207, at 803 10.
296. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955, 1004 (1988).
297. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 62 (New
York: Basic Books 1983).
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conflation in the popular imagination of so-called "illegal aliens" with
Mexican nationals.29 8
This recent history offers a strong reason for the Supreme Court o invoke
an immigrant right to work. According to Professor Cass Sunstein:
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely
(though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-
run departures. The clause has therefore been associated with a particu-
lar conception of judicial review, one that sees the courts as safeguards
against novel developments brought about by temporary majorities
who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.
299
The current hostility to immigrant work is a recent phenomenon and the
traditional view of substantive due process should protect against it. Yet,
labor and employment laws in general are a "recent phenomenon" when
viewed against the full scope of United States history.300 The concern then is
that a substantive due process right to work might be used to undermine labor
and employment laws in general, not just those that limit immigrant work.
This is where the Obergefell focus on anti-subordination as a constraining
principle for substantive due process is relevant.30 1
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy looked to whether LGBT persons had
experienced subordination that explained their exclusion from the right of
marriage. Like LGBT persons, immigrants-especially Asian and Latino
ones-have experienced subordination i countless ways throughout Ameri-
can history: restrictions on immigrants' rights and privileges, selective
enforcement of criminal laws against them, mass internment, draconian
deportation campaigns, hostile public rhetoric, and attacks on their physical
safety.30 2 The Supreme Court has even recognized that "Aliens as a class are
a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority" requiring special
judicial protection, because majoritarian politics cannot be relied upon to do
so.303
The subordination of unauthorized immigrants has often been effectuated
by policies that limit their rights while simultaneously encouraging or at least
tolerating their availability as low-cost labor. Justice Brennan described this
298. Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 282 (1997).
299. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988).
300. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review
and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 354 (2002).
301. See Yoshino, supra note 26 at 175.
302. See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7
MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 450 54 (2002); See also Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation":
Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 111 (1996).
303. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
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reality in Plyler v. Doe, in which the Court struck down Texas's effort to deny
public education to undocumented immigrant children:
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented
resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap
labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides
itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
304
As a general matter, there can be little doubt that immigrants-especially
unauthorized ones-have experienced subordination.30 5 This is particularly
true in the workplace, where they are forced to work in the underground
economy or be independent contractors or self-employed.30 6 They accept
exploitative conditions and risk deportation for just trying to feed themselves
and their families.
Given the historical foundations for an immigrant right to work and the
subordination that noncitizens have experienced, they should have a right to
work regardless of whether they have a formal immigration status. That is not
to say that every restriction on immigrant work will violate the right. There is
a fundamental right to marriage, but the right to marry is not infringed by
every burden on it; for example, the government can impose a special tax on
married couples without violating the right itself.30 7 In deciding whether
there has been a violation of a right, the Court considers "[t]he directness and
substantiality of the interference,30 8 meaning that a court may well conclude
that some reasonable restrictions on immigrant work do not infringe upon the
right. Even when rights are infringed, courts may allow the violation to occur
if there is a sufficiently important state interest in doing so and the restriction
is carefully tailored.30 9
The extent to which the right to work can be abridged as a constitutional
matter and the policy rationales for regulating immigrant work are beyond
304. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 19 (1982).
305. Anthony O'Rourke, Substantive Due Process for Noncitizens: Lessons from Obergefell, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 17 (2015).
306. Part IV.D, supra.
307. See, e.g., Druker v. C.I.R., 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982).
308. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978).
309. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1283 97 (2007)
(describing the evolution of "strict scrutiny" in various contexts, including substantive due process).
For an argument that a lesser standard of review applied to rights violations at the time of the Lochner
Court, which was focused on analysis of the government's "police power," see Victoria F. Nourse, A
Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental
Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009). Generally, ifa right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," the Court considers it to be fundamental and applies strict scrutiny, although that
standard is of relatively recent origin and could be modified going forward. See Fallon, 54 UCLA L.
REV. at 1281-85. The question of what level of judicial scrutiny is appropriate for addressing
violations of the immigrant right to work is an important one, but is beyond the scope of this article.
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the scope of this Article. However, even without addressing these doctrinal
questions, it is possible to draw two basic conclusions that follow from the
existence of a right to work.
First, if there is a right to work, that means that the starting point for any
conversation about immigrants working should not be whether Congress has
specifically authorized it, but whether Congress has prohibited it. There
should be no impediment, for example, to the president offering work
authorization to unauthorized immigrants without specific congressional
approval, as President Obama attempted with his Deferred Action for
Parental Accountability ("DAPA") program.3 10
Second, direct and substantial interference with e right to work ought to
trigger some level of judicial review. The criminalization of unauthorized
work, for example, would seem to be such a direct and substantial interfer-
ence. When Arizona and Alabama attempted to criminalize unauthorized
work, their laws were struck down as being preempted by federal law.
3 11
However, if Congress were to criminalize unauthorized work, the preemption
doctrine would not apply, and one of the few constitutional checks on such an
action might be the constitutional right to work. Similarly, if Congress were
to attempt to withdraw work authorization from a category of noncitizens
that currently has it, like asylees and refugees, a constitutional right-to-work
claim also might be one of the only bases for legally challenging such action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Immigrants' right to work is not officially dead, just dying. No court has
ever overruled Yick Wo, and no statute has been passed saying "unauthorized
aliens" cannot work. But any reasonable bystander looking at the condition
of immigrants' right to work would say that it needs resuscitation. So many
statutory and regulatory impediments to immigrant work have been created
that it has come to be putatively illegal. Moreover, no court has enforced a
substantive due process right to work since the Lochner era.
Restrictions on immigrant work may ultimately serve a symbolic function
more than they advance any legitimate policy goal.31 2 To some citizens who
have lost economic status in the global economy, they may reflect a
commitment to preserving American jobs for American citizens. Yet, in
practice, they diminish workplace protections and civil liberties for citizens
310. See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO
INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS (2014). The Fifth
Circuit upheld an injunction against he DAPA program and it never went into effect. Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 187 88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
311. See Arizona and Alabama, supra note 202.
312. See Pham, supra note 207, at 817.
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just as they subordinate unauthorized immigrant workers.3 13
The early immigrant right-to-work cases recognized a basic principle that
is strangely missing from today's debate about unauthorized immigration: all
humans have a right to work to support themselves.314 This principle is not
only codified in international law, but is also deeply rooted in United States
history and in foundational documents like the Declaration of Indepen-
dence.315 The movement away from the never-overruled constitutional
jurisprudence of immigrants' right to work was a radical shift that seems
inevitable only because it occurred under the radar, mostly without congres-
sional action, over years of bureaucratic half-measures.316
The anti-subordination logic of Obergefell offers a principled way to
recognize immigrants' right to work without also resurrecting all the prob-
lems associated with Lochner. In order to assert a right to work, a claimant
would need to be a member of a subordinated class. Employers would not
generally have standing to enforce a right to work for their employees, and
workers could not raise claims to defend exploitative work conditions that
exacerbate rather than remedy subordination in the face of government health
and safety regulations.
Restrictions that directly and substantially interfere with immigrant work
would trigger judicial review. Moreover, the recognition of an immigrant
right to work would shift the discussion in cases involving work authoriza-
tion from whether Congress has specifically authorized work, to whether it
has prohibited it. Thus, there should be no constitutional problem with the
president authorizing a large class of unauthorized migrants to work, as
President Obama attempted to do with his DAPA program.
Not all presidents want to broaden work authorization, so it is equally
possible that in the future the federal government will act to restrict
noncitizens' ability to work. In these cases, the right to work might provide
the most potent, if not only, form of challenge. Immigrant rights advocates
have successfully challenged state legislation as being preempted by federal
law or as violating equal protection.17 But preemption provides no check on
federal limitations on immigrant work, and the Supreme Court has some-
times applied only rational basis review to federal action, despite the fact that
the Court mostly applies strict scrutiny to state discrimination.318
313. See Wishnie, supra note 12; Griffith, Migrant Worker Law, supra note 7, at 140; Lee, Private
Immigration Screening, supra note 223.
314. See Part JI.B, supra.
315. See Part 1I.B, supra.
316. See Part IILA, supra.
317. See Arizona and Alabama, supra note 202.
318. Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976) (rational basis review of federal
discrimination concerning the allocation of Medicaid benefits), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to Arizona's durational residency requirement for noncitizen
receipt of welfare benefits).
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Both the proper standard of review and policy arguments for or against
particular types of regulation are beyond the scope of the article. There are no
doubt good economic arguments for preventing some immigrants from
working, as well as arguments that society would be better off with no
regulation.31 9 Assessing those arguments requires rigorous empirical study.
But, at a minimum, if Congress wishes to prohibit immigrant work it should
have a legitimate reason for doing so. Anti-immigrant sentiment alone ought
not to suffice. A constitutional right with a lengthy pedigree should not be
abridged based on prejudice or unexamined assumptions.
319. See, e.g., Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at
Occupation-Level Evidence, 14 LABOUR ECON. 757 (2007) (finding that an increase in foreign-born
workers tends to lower the wages of natives in blue collar occupations but does not have a statistically
significant impact on the wages of natives in skilled occupations).
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